The New View of the Property Tax: A Reformulation by Peter M. Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No. l48l




Financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant
SES82—O9210) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank A.
Friauf arid J. Sutberfield for research assistance. The research
reported here is partofthe NBER's research prgran inTaxation
arid proj ect in Government Budget. Any opinions expressed are those
ofthe authors andnot those oftheNational Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper #i8i
October l984
TheNew View ofthe Property Tax:
AReformulation
ABSTRACT
The"new view" ofthe property tax is reformulated within the con—
text ofamodelwith interjurisdictionalcompetition, endogenous local
public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities
according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use
zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes
by local governments. Expressions for the "profits tax" and"excisetax"
effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a "consumption
distortion" away from government services due to local reluctance to tax
mobile capital are also examined.
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There are two popular but highly contradictory theoretical views
regarding the effects of the local property tax. Thefirstis the "benefit
view", developed by Hamilton (1975), Fischel (1975) and White (1975),which
holds that interjurisdictional competition and factor and consumer mobility,
coupled with homogeneous local jurisdictions with the appropriate zoning
restrictions,' ensure that theproperty tax is a benefit tax ——a
distortionary and non—redistributive user charge for local public services
provided to individuals and businesses.
This view contrasts markedly with the "new view" of the property tax,
which holds that the primary effect of nationwide use of the local property
tax is to reduce the net return to capital, while tax differentials result in
relatively less important effects on consumer prices and returns to
imperfectly mobile factors of production.2 In this analysis, the property
tax results in many distortions, especially in capital allocation, and has
an important redistributive component as the main burden is borne by
capitalists. The new view was developed by Mieszkowski (1972) who, building
on the work of Brown (1924) and Thompson (1965),utilizedthe Ilarberger
(1962) fixed capital stock, perfectly competitive general equilibrium model
of national tax incidence to analyze the property tax.
In an earlier article (Zodrow and Mieszkowskj, 1983), we argued that
the critical assumption underlying the benefit view result is that fiscal
zoning is sufficiently precise that households and firms arc not able to
adjust their demand for capital. Interjurisdictional competition implies
that benefit taxes are optimal from the viewpoint of the local government,
and precise zoning converts the property tax to a benefit tax so that
consumers of local public services cannot "free—ride" at the expense of
non—resident or industrial capital owners. However, we noted that local head
taxes are never observed while the precise zoning requirements described in
the benefit view literature are seldom observed. Accordingly, we suggested
that limitations on the use of precise zoning, coupled with local reliance on
property tax finance, would imply that the effects of the property tax were
accurately described by the new view.
Ne develop this suggestion formally in this paper. Our goal is to
present a reformulation of the new view which takes into account some of the
features of local use of the property tax stressed by proponents of the
Ibenefit view; these features are ignored in the Mieszkowski (1972) new—view
derivation based on theilarbergergeneral equilibrium model of national tax
incidence, which abstracts from local government behavior by taking public
services and taxes as exogenous. Specifically, our approach differs from the
original derivation in five important respects. First, we allow for
independent local jurisdictions in the economy that compete along
Cournot—Nash lines, as each local jurisdiction takes the tax and expenditure
policies of other jurisdictions (and the national net return to capital) as
fixed; thus local government tax and expenditure policies are endogenous in
the model. Second, we explicitly include local public services in individual
utility functions and allow individuals to differ in their tastes. Third, we
take into account the composition of individual jurisdictions and assume, as
predicted by Tiebout (1956) and benefit view proponents, that individuals are
segregated into communities according to their tastes for public services; as
in many of the benefit view models, we assume that local jurisdictions are
homogeneous. Fourth, we allow for a simple form of land use zoning in our
model. Finally, we obtain explicit expressions for the "profits tax" and
"excise tax" portions of the burden of the property tax,3 and we
identify the effects of a "consumption distortion" induced by local reluctance
to subject mobile capital to property taxation. Within this more general
context, we demonstrate that, except for the special case of perfect fiscal
zoning noted above, the results of the new view of the property tax are quite
robust; we also analyze the incidence effects of the endogeneity of local
public service levels.
Our model is described in detail in the following section, while the
incidence results are presented in Section III. An illustrative numerical
example is presented in Section IV and the final section briefly summarizes
the results.
II. THE 1ODEL
We adopt the standard neoclassical assumptions of a fixed national
capital stock (KT). full employment, perfectly competitive product and
and factor markets, and perfect mobility of capital across all jurisdictions.
The economy is divided in N jurisdictions, each of which has the same fixed
land area (VT).4 We assume that individuals are segregated into
jurisdictions which are homogeneous according to tastes for public services;
2there are N1 jurisdictions composed exclusively of "high demanders" and
N2 jurisdictions composed exclusively of "low demanders," with N
N1 +N2.Each jurisdiction is assumed to have the same number of
identical individuals ——eachhas the same utility function, supplies the
same amount of labor inelasticaliy,5 and owns an equal share of the
jurisdiction's land. Capital ownership is shared equally among all residents
in the economy and, unlike land, capital need not be invested in the
jurisdiction of residence. Since we are concerned primarily with the
production—side effects of the property tax, we make the simplifying
assumption on the demand side that all individuals have a Cobb—Douglas
utility function defined over consumption of housing, local public services
and the composite good. Public goods are modeled as equally—shared public
purchases of the composite good and are treated as publicly—provided private
goods (see Hamilton (1983) for a justification). Since the Cobb—Douglas
utility function is homogeneous of degree one, the aggregate utility
(U.) of a typical jurisdiction j(thesum of residents' utilities) is
given by
(1) U. =ain H. +f3.in G. +y.lnC., j=1,2,
3 3 3 3 3 3
wherea+J3.+-y. =1and H., G. and C. arc aggregate housing, public good
and composite good consumption in j.Theindirect utility function associated
with (1), neglecting constant terms, is
(1) U =(a+y.)lnI. —alii q. —y.lnp +3.In 6.,
3 3 .1 3 3 3 3
wherep is the price of composite good which is assumed to be identical
across all jurisdictions, while q. is the price of housing and I.
is aggregate net income in jurisdiction j.Sincejurisdictions of type one
are those composed of high demanders, > 2 and <2 Note that
we assume for simplicity that a does not vary across jurisdictions.
The production technology is the same in both types of juris-
dictions. In each jurisdiction, the composite good is produced with a
constant returns to scale production function using capital, labor and
land. Housing is produced with a constant returns to scale production
function using capital and land. Since public services are modeled as
public purchases of the composite good, there is no separate public goods
3techno logy.
Within this type of analytical framework, we have shown elsewhere
(Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1983) that if theindividuallocal jurisdictions
have head taxes at their disposal, they will use them exclusively and not
rely on property tax finance; each local government fears that using the
property tax will drive out mobile capital and lower land rents and so
instead utilizes only head tax finance. Such a "head tax equilibrium", where
all jurisdictions of both types finance all local services exclusively with
head taxes, is the benchmark for our analysis; this initial equilibrium
corresponds to the case of property taxation coupled with perfect fiscal
zoning which induces each household (firm) to consume (use) the efficient
amount of capital.
The level of public services in the initial equilibrium is chosen by
the local government to maximize (1') and is financed by head taxes Z.,
while housing and composite good demands are determined by the maximization
of (1') subject to an aggregate net income constraint. This yields
(2) pG. =Z.3,I./(a+y.)
.3 .3 3.3 .3
(3) pci =y.I./(a+y.)
(4) q.H.a1./(a+y.). 33 .3 .3
Our assumptions about factor ownership and equal—size jurisdictions
with identical populations and production technologies, combined with the
abàve demand functions, imply that composite good and housing production and
all prices are identical in the two jurisdictions in the initial equilibrium.
G
Identical factor prices imply that gross incomes I. =I.+Z.;are
also equal. Thus jurisdictions differ only in public and private demands for
the composite good. The use of head tax finance corresponds to the Tiebout
paradigm where binding zoning requirements convert property tax assessments
into head tax levies.
Our method of relaxing the perfect zoning assumption is to assume that
local zoning ordinances are limited to fixing residential and non—residential
land use at the initial efficient levels and to introduce a constitutional or
political restriction on the permitted level of head taxation; this level is
determined by the value of ,anexogenous parameter which specifies that
only PZ. can be collected as head taxes in each jurisdiction. Thus a
4reduction in 5 implies an equiproportionate reduction in headtaxes in the
two jurisdictions. Given P (and p and r), eachgovernment sets T to
maximize U., where T. =1+r.and tisand ad—valorcm tas on the return
3 3 .3 .3
to capital in jurisdiction j. The effects of the nationwidesystem of property
taxes are obtained as the changes in al] endogenous variablesin response to an
exogenous change in The differential incidence expressions shown below
are calculated at the initial head tax (zero property tax)equilibrium (T. 0 =1);
3
7 thus, they are only approximations for changes from finite levels ofproperty taxation.
The details of our model are as follows. Forgiven values of
Z1, Z2 and 0thereare six endogenous varibles in our model, the
two property tax rates (T1 andT2), housing prices (q1 and
the composite good price (p) and the after—tax rate ofreturn on capital Cr).
The development of the six—equation equilibriumsystem is simplified if we follow
a dual approach.8 Our zoning assumption coupled with inelasticallysupplied
labor imply that, in each jurisdiction, labor andnon—residential land arc a fixed
composite factor, hereafter referred to simply as "labor" and denotedas L; resi-
dential land is similarly fixed, referred to as "land",and denoted as V.9 Note
that the quantities of the fixed factors do notvary across the two types of juris-
dictions. We thus can construct restricted profit functionsin each jurisdiction
X3(PrTL) and n11(q,rT,v).Letting subscripts denote partial
differentiation, with the r subscript denoting differentiationwith respect to the
gross price of capital rT.,, we have
Xj=Lni=x. p Lp j





(9) = = —K
r Yr Hj
(10) =s.
where w. and s. are the returns to the fixed factors (the division
.3 3
of the return to L. between workers and non—residential landowners is 3
arbitrary). The following definitions will be useful. Theown—price capital
5demand elasticity in the composite good sector, weighted by the amountof
capital used, is
(11) =—K•[(rT./K )aK .Ia(rT.)] =ruXi= X3=Xj> o.
Xj Xj Xj rr rp pr
Similarly, inthehousing sector,
(12) =—K.[(rT/K •)OK ./a(rTi] =rn'1=q.n11=_q•3> 0.
Hj jHj Hj rr jrq jqr




Twoequations of the equilibrium system are provided by (4) for
j1,2,where
(15) I. rK IN +w.L+s.V—Z.
.1 T i
and KT is the total capital stock.
A third equilibrium equation is implied by the fixed national capital
stock constraint which, using (6) and (9) can be written as:
(16)K +N(XlHl)+N(X2÷112) =
T1 r r 2 r r
Thederivationof the fourth and fifth equations is more complex. The
problem faced by each jurisdictional government is to choose the tax rate T.to
maximize aggregate utility (1') subject to the budget constraint:
(17) C. =Z.—(T.—1)
i rr
The change in net income with respect to changes in T perceived by each
government (i.e., holding p.. r and 9 constant) is
(18) aI./aT. =H.aq/aT.—rK.
3 3ii 3 3
6where K. =K .+ K Thus, the first order condition for
j Xj Ilj
this optimization problem is
(19) [(a+y.)/I.][q.ll.i .—rK.T) —ar +(13.rK./pG.){T.—(T.--1),1 .1 =0, jj qj j jj K3
where
T1qjis the perceived elasticity of housing prices with respect
to property tax changes, and
11Kj
is the perceived elasticity of the capital
stock with respect to property tax changes. Differentiating (4). holding 9,p
and r fixed, yields
(20)
1qj
where =(rKT/N)/I?is the capital share in gross income.
Differentiating (6) and (9), holding p, 0 and r constant, yields:
(21)
'Kj—(T/K)aK/aT xLn1qj)h/Kj
Substituting from (20) yields:
21? = 0
Kj K. (a±'y.)t.+y.




The three terms of this first order condition indicate that, forany 0, the
government raises its property tax rate as long as the value of the marginal
increase in revenue from the higher taxes (first term) outweighs the loss in
revenue from the lower tax base (second term) and the loss in fixed factor
income due capital out—migration. Note that differentiating (22) with
respect to T., holding p., r and 0 fixed, substituting from (20), (18)
and from
(23) 8G./aT. = jj Kj j
andevaluating at the initial equilibrium yields the second order condition
for each government's optimization problem:
7(24) o. = > 0.





where units are chosen so that p =q1
=
q2
1 in the initial
equilibrium. The six equation equilibrium system is thus described by (14)
and (22) for j 1,2, (16) and (25).
III. DIFFERENTIAL INCIDENCE RESULTS
Totally differentiating the system of five equations described above
yields the "equations of change" for the model ——thechanges in the
endogenous variables as a function of changes in the exogenous 0 parameter.
Our symmetry assumptions ensure that many quantities, including all housing
market variables, gross income shares, capital stock variables and all
derivatives of the profit functions, are identical in the initial
equilibrium; to simplify the notation in the discussion below, the j
subscripts are dropped for all such quantities. The system of differential
equations for the model, calculated when T. =01is:







where the tilde denotes logarathniic differentiation. Solving this five
equation system yields the differential incidence results, which are
presented as elasticities of the endogenous variables with respect to a
reduction in 0; thus, (0/T1)T1/d0, etc.
The elasticities of the tax rates are
8(30) =2+y1)(2 t11a)J/D> 0
(31) 5T2a1 22 XI +t11(j)j/fl
>0
where, as shown in the appendix, D is the positive determinant of the
coefficient matrix of the differential equation system. Thus,property tax
rates in both jurisdictions must increase when the permitted level of head







(33)£_E = (ZN)[RX(H+1_a)+iH(1_a)1> 0.
Thus, property taxes rise more in jurisdictions oftype one ——high—demander
jurisdictions have higher property tax rates.
The price elasticity expressions presented beloware each separated
into two sets of terms. The first set reflects the "new—view"effects of
local use of the property tax as specified by (30—31), andare described in
terms of a "profits—tax effect" and some associated "excise—taxeffects".
The second set reflects the effects of the "consumption distortion"induced
by the reduction in the permitted level of head taxation. This distortion
arises for the following reason. In the initial head—taxequilibrium, the
opportunity cost of government services is simply p, the price of the
composite good. However when local governments use property tax finance,
each government perceives a higher price as provision ofpublic services has
the additional cost of driving out mobile capital (as determinedby K• 10 3
and lowering local incomes.Since government services are modeled simply
as public purchases of the composite good, this consumption distortion has
theeffectof reducing total consumption of the composite good(XT =











02 =ol(a+y2)132tiK2/D > 0
Theprice changes induced by the reduction inare as follows. The
changein the net return to capital is
(36) 6r =_[(Nl/N)sTl+(N2/N)c]
—x_n)i0i+N20z
The first term in (36) is unambiguously negative and, by itself, indicates
that capital bears the full burden of property taxation in the economy; this
"pure profits tax effect" occurs if
(37) K,dr =—[(N1rK1)dT1+(N2rK2)dT2I,
or if
(38) 8r =— I(Nl/N)eTl+(N2/N)elJ.
The second term in (36) reflects the effect of the consumption distortion, as
the demand for capital falls (rises) in the composite good (housing) sector
which reduces (increases) the net return to capital; the net effect depends
on the sign of (—)whichis theoretically ambiguous.
Throughout our exposition below, we assume that either (ii—ii11)￿.O or,
if not, the magnitude of the terms involving (1xItH) is sufficiently
small that they do not change the signs of otherwise theoretically unambiguous
expressions; this assumption is satisfied for all plausible parameter values.
For the particular price normalization (25) chosen, the change in the
price of the composite good is determined solely by the effects of the
consumption distortion, as
(39) C=
the reduction in composite good demand drives down its price. The changes in








where X, defined in the appendix, is positive for all plausibleparameter
values. The first terms in (40) and (41) reflect one of the excise tax
effects of the property tax differential. Note that these termsrepresent a
pure redistribution of income between housing consumers in the two
jurisdictions (multiplying the terms by N1 andNV respectively,
and adding yields zero) as higher housing prices in the high tax
jurisdictions are offset by lower housing prices in the low tax
jurisdictions. The second terms in (40) and (41) indicate that the increased
housing consumption induced by the consumption distortion drives up housing
prices in both jurisdictions.
The changes in the returns to labor are calculated by differentiating
(7) and substituting from the tax and price elasticities above toyield
(42) —
L5w2N1(Y(2) [JiX(ll+1_a)+1H( 1a)])
where is the labor share of gross income andy1 is the
composite good capital stock share of gross income. The first terms
in (42) and (43) again represent an "excise tax effect" of theproperty
tax differential which results in a pure redistribution of income; the
lower wage payments made to the fixed factors in composite good production
in the high tax jurisdictions are exactly offset by higher wages in the
low tax jurisdictions. The second terms in (42) and (43) indicate that
the consumption distortion away from the composite good lowers the returns
to labor in both jurisdictions.
The last set of price changes in the model are the changes in land





where y., and y are the land and housing capital shares in gross
income. Substituting into (44) from the tax and price elasticities above








1and2 aredefined in the appendix. The sign of A
is positive if, in the high tax jurisdictions, the negative effect on land
prices of higher taxes (which drive out capital and lower the marginal
productivity of land) outweighs the positive effect of higher housing
prices. In this case, the excise tax effects of the property tax
differential, the first terms in (45) and (46), indicate that lower land
prices in the high tax jurisdictions are exactly offset by higher land
prices in the low tax jurisdiction. In any case, these terms represent a
pure redistribution of income between landowners in the two types of
jurisdictions. Finally, since and B2 are positive, the second
terms in (45) and (46) indicate that in both jurisdictions the price of land,
the immobile factor in housing production, increases due to the consumption
distortion toward greater housing consumption.
IV. A NUflER1CAL EXANPLE
For purposes of illustration, we present a simple numerical example
in this section. Consider our model for the case where 3i0.10* 320.05*
y 0.60, 12=0.65* N1=N=1 and the composite good (housing) productionfunction
is Cobb—Douglas with a capital share parameter of 0.3 (0.7). Suppose further
that in the initial equilibrium pq1=q21, and KxKO.3O4* L=l.70, V=l.0 which
implies r1, w0.418 and s=0.13l. In this case, the relevant elasticities are
x0435' 1T111-'l.Ol5 and 1Ki.837,
12The numerical valuesfor te tax and price elasticities arc
shownbelow; whentwo numbers are 1 is ted and then added, the first
corresponds to the profits tax or excise taxeffectsof the property tax
differential and the second corresponds to the effects of theconsumption
distortion,as discussed in Section III. The elasticitiesare:
=.194 c =.110 a =—.0114
a —.152 + .005=—. 147 r
a=.0259+ .0178=.0437 qi
c .= —.0259+.0050 =
qz
y a =—.00881—.00892 =—.01773 L wi
.00881 —00892 =—.00011
—.00103+ .00307=.00204
ya j,"-.00103+.00017 .00120. V Sb
The signs of all expressions are as described in the previous
sec tion. The return to capital falls due to the "profits tax" portion of
the tax, and the excise tax effects cause higher housing prices and lower
wages and landpricesinthehigh tax jurisdictions with exactly
offsetting effects in the low tax jurisdictions. The consumption
distortion results in higher housing prices and higher land prices, as
well as lower composite good pricc and lower wages, in bothtypes of
jurisdictions.
Note that the consumption distortion component of ais quite
small, so that the profits tax effect of the property tax differential on
the return to capital isnotmitigated to anysignificantextent.
However, thecOnsuraption distortioneffects are more important for the
13other price changes; inparticular,theconsumptiondistortion effects
dominate the excise tax effects for aand a ,sothat wages w2 si
fall in the low tax jurisdiction and land prices rise in the high tax
jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the effects of nationwide use o. the property tax by
independent local jurisdictions within the context of a model with (i)
intcrjurisdictional competition, (ii) endogenous local public service levels
which are included in individual utility functions, (iii) individuals who
differ in their tastes for public services and are segregated by taste into
homogeneous communities, (iv) a simple form of land use zoning, and (v) a
political or constitutional constraint on local use of head taxes. Within
the context of this more general model relative to the Mieszkowski (1972)
analysis ——weobtained two sets of results. First, we presented a
reformulated version of the "new view" of the incidence of the property tax;
in particular, we derived expressions for the "profits tax" effect which
lowers the return to capital by the amount of the tax, and the "excise tax"
effects which cause pure redistributions of income between factor owners
and consumers in the two types of local jurisdictions in the model. Second,
we showed that local reluctance to impose a property tax on mobile capital
results in a "consumption distortion" away from government services and
derived the effects of this phenomenon on commodity and factor prices.
14F OOTNOTES
1.Hamilton (1976) has extended the benefit view result to thecase of
non—homogeneous communities in a model where fiscal differentials are
capitalized into house prices; we limit our analysis to the case of
homogeneous communities.
2. Throighout the paper we consider only the effects of the capitalportion
of the property tax.
3. Our paper is thus a partial response to Aaron (1975,p. 42) who notes
that "the theoretical foundations of the new view are incomplete. "The
profits tax and excise tax terminology follows Mieszkowski (1972).
4. Jurisdictions of different land areas could easily be introduced intothe
model as multiples of our constant size jurisdictions.
5. We make this assumption because allowing a variable laborsupply would
complicate the analysis considerably without changing the basic nature
of the results since residents are immobile between jurisdictions in the
sense that "high demanders" do not wish to move "low demander" juris—
dictions and vice versa. For analyses of property taxation in models
where labor is mobile between jurisdictions, see Brueckner (1981) and
Starrett (1980).
6. This methodology follows Atkinson and Stern (1974).
7. For the methodology of relaxing the assumption of zero initial distorting
taxes, see Ballentine and Ens (1975) and Vandendorpe and Friedlaender
(1976). Also, Courant (1977) addresses this question within theproperty
tax context.
8. See Diewert (1978) for a thorough discussion of duality in differential
incidence analysis and proofs of assertions made below regarding re-
stricted profit functions.
9. Our identical residents are assumed to own an equal share of bothtypes
ofland,
10. See Zodrow and Mieszkowskj (1984) for a detailed discussion of the
question of the effects of property tax finance on local public service
levels.
11. Expressions (34—35) are obtained by substituting from (5) and (8) into
the definitions of XT and 11T' differentiating, and substituting from
(30.—31) as well as (36), (39), and (40—41) below.
15APPENDIX
The expressions for the D, X, A, B1 and B2 parameters used
in the text are provided in this appendix. The expression for D is obtained
by evaluating the coefficient matrix of the differential equations (26—29)




We assume the system is stable, which imples D>0 (see Neary, 1978, or
Atkinson and Stiglita, 1980); note that all terms other than
are unambiguously positive.
The expression for ). is
(A.2) =
Thesign of X is ambiguous. However, the difference between the perceived
capital supply elasticity parameters and K2 is quite small for





whichis unambiguously positive, we assume that X>0.




16A is positive if, in the high tax jurisdiction, the effect on land prices of
higher taxes which drive out capital and lower the marginal productivity of
land (the first term in A.3) outweighs the effect of higher housing prices
which increase the demand for land (the second and third terms of A.3).
Finally, the expressions for and B2 are
(A.4)B1(01,02) =
(A.5)B2(01,02) =
Barringimplausibly large (in absolute value) negative values of
both B1 and B2 are positive.
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